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Resolving Shareholder Disputes and
Breaking Deadlocks in the
Close Corporation
Harold D. Field, Jr.*
"All's love, yet all's law."
-Robert Browning
What happens when the shareholders of a close corporation1
are no longer close?
At the time a close corporation is formed, or at the time a
new owner joins the business by acquiring stock of the corpora-
tion, the participants tend to be friendly toward each other and
enthusiastic about the prospects of the business. Indeed, they
are often impatient with whatever detailed documentation coun-
sel recommends to reflect their new relationship.2  At a later
date, however, enthusiasm, friendship and even family ties some-
times give way to hostility and deadlock. That impatiently tol-
erated formality, the governing legal documentation, then must
be painstakingly reviewed to determine the rights of the war-
ring factions. If the by-laws and the shareholders' agreement
make no special provision for resolving disputes and breaking
deadlocks, the rights of the factions must be determined under
a legislative framework, which until recently has often failed to
deal with the relationships and problems unique to the close
corporation.3 Thus a dissatisfied shareholder, unless the holder
of a controlling or even a two-thirds interest, 4 may be locked into
* Partner, Leonard, Street and Deinard, Minneapolis, Minnesota.
1. In a close corporation, the stock is held by a few shareholders
who in most cases serve as the directors and key employees. For an
attempt to define the term "close corporation" see Note, Some Specific
Needs of the Close Corporation Not Met Under the Minnesota Business
Corporation Act: Suggestions for Statutory Relief, 54 MnN. L. REv. 1008
& n.1 (1970). See also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 342 (Cum. Supp. 1968).
2. The governing legal documentation consists of articles of in-
corporation, e.g., ABA-ALI MoDEL Bus. CORP. ACT §§ 54-56 (2d ann.
ed. 1971) [hereinafter cited as MODEL ACT]; corporate by-laws, e.g.,
MODEL ACT § 27; a shareholders' agreement, e.g., MODEL ACT § 34;
and employment contracts with the shareholder employees. By this doc-
umentation, provisions are often made for shareholder representation on
the board of directors, compensation of shareholder employees, and re-
strictions on the transferability of the shares of stock.
3. F. O'NEAL, CLOSE CoRPORATIONs: LAW Am Pn~crxc § 1.01
(1971) [hereinafter cited as O'NEAL]. See note 4 infra.
4. Under most corporate statutes, a noncontrolling shareholder is
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an ongoing relationship with business associates who will not
agree to a separation on acceptable terms. Since no ready mar-
ket exists for a noncontrolling stock interest in the typical
close corporation, the dissatisfied shareholder is generally un-
able to find a third party willing to offer a fair value for the
noncontrolling shares. 5
This Article reviews four remedial arrangements to deal
with the problems of dissension and deadlock among the prin-
cipals in a close corporation: (1) a buy-out of one of the disput-
ing parties, (2) an easy dissolution, (3) an arbitration, and (4)
an appointment of a provisional (tie-breaking) director. As
noted above, many existing statutes have not adequately recog-
nized the close corporation, establishing instead general guide-
lines for the regulation of all corporations. Thus the thrust of
much of this Article is prophylactic, to suggest that the share-
holders in a close corporation make early arrangements for the
treatment of possible future corporate acrimony. Initially, of
course, the shareholders will try to resolve any conflict without
resort to a remedial arrangement, which may strike at the struc-
ture, ownership and very existence of the corporation.0 Failing
not in a position to liquidate his holdings. Premised upon the regula-
tion of large, publicly owned corporations, the corporate acts of most
states require the assent of a majority or two-thirds of the shareholders
prior to any "fundamental" or "organic" change in the corporate struc-
ture. By definition the noncontrolling shareholder is unable to muster
the required votes.
For provisions covering the voting requirement prior to merger or
consolidation see, e.g., MODEL ACT § 73 (majority); Aniz. Rsv. STAT.
ANN. § 10-344 (1956) (two-thirds); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 251(c)
(Cum. Supp. 1968) (two-thirds); MiNN. STAT. § 301.42(2) (1971) (two-
thirds, unless otherwise specified in the articles of incorporation, but not
less than one-half). For the voting requirements prior to a sale of as-
sets see, e.g., MODEL ACT § 79 (majority); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 271
(Cum. Supp. 1968) (majority); MlNN. STAT. § 301.36 (1971) (two-thirds,
unless otherwise specified in the articles of incorporation, but not less
than one-half); ANN. Mo. STAT. § 351.400 (1966) (three-fourths); W.
VA. CODE ANN. § 31-1-64 (1972) (60 percent). For the voting require-
ments prior to a voluntary dissolution see, e.g., MODEL ACT § 84 (ma-
jority); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 275(b) (Cum. Supp. 1968) (two-
thirds); MiNN. STAT. § 301.47(1) (1971) (two-thirds); W. VA. CODE
ANN. § 31-1-80 (1972) (60 percent present and affirming). For a dis-
cussion of dissolution see note 22 infra and accompanying text.
5. Israels, The Sacred Cow of Corporate Existence: Problems of
Deadlock and Dissolution, 19 U. Cm. L. REv. 778, 779 (1952). Moreover,
in a close corporation there is a special emphasis upon maintaining the
existing coterie of owners, and restrictions upon the transferability of
the stock may have been imposed to protect against stock purchases by
outsiders. See notes 13-15 infra and accompanying text.
6. In this sense arbitration is the least drastic of the remedies,
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such a resolution, however, the shareholders must rely upon a
remedial arrangement, be it prescribed by the law of the jurisdic-
tion or by their own governing documents.
I. DEFINING THE PROBLEM
Practically, the terms dissension and deadlock have meaning
only in the context of a particular close corporate situation,
and therefore must be precisely defined in the by-laws or share-
holders' agreement for the purpose of triggering any remedial
provision. Academically, however, the first step in analyzing
the scope and efficacy of the four remedial arrangements is to
set forth the broad meaning of these two terms. Dissension
simply means disagreement among shareholders. One share-
holder might want the corporation to borrow money in order to
expand, while another shareholder might be violently opposed
to having the corporation incur a substantial liability. One
shareholder might be anxious to have the corporation declare a
dividend, while another might be firmly committed to a policy
of reinvesting all earnings in the business. Dissension, it should
be noted, has no relation to voting power. There could be just
as much disagreement between a 90 percent shareholder and a
10 percent shareholder as between two 50 percent shareholders.
Voting power may well determine the outcome of a disagree-
ment, but counting votes is not the same thing as curing dis-
sension.
The term deadlock is much more difficult to define than
dissension. The clearest example of a deadlock occurs where
there is at once a dispute between two 50 percent shareholders
and between two numerically equal factions comprising the
board of directors.7 In such a case, courts have had no difficulty
in finding that a deadlock exists.8 A less clear case is presented
making a decision rather than changing the decision-makers. See text
accompanying note 28 infra.
7. The existence of such a deadlock and the allegation of misman-
agement and abuse of authority caused the court to affirm an order
overruling the demurrer to a petition for involuntary dissolution in In
re Involuntary Dissolution of Hedberg-Freidhein & Co., 233 Minn. 534,
47 N.W.2d 424 (1951).
8. Before ordering dissolution of a corporation, a court will re-
quire a showing of more than an incurable deadlock: that adverse and
serious results flow from the deadlock or that the corporation can no
longer function for the benefit of the shareholders. In re Involuntary
Dissolution of Lakeland Dev. Corp., 277 Minn. 432, 443, 152 N.W.2d 758,
766 (1967); In Te Involuntary Dissolution of Hedberg-Freidheim & Co,
233 Minn. 534, 539, 47 N.W.2d 424, 427 (1951). For a working definition
1974]
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where there is a dispute between 60 percent and 40 percent share-
holders, but a two-thirds vote is required for an action proposed
by the 60 percent shareholder. The proponent could well claim
that a deadlock exists. The opposing party, on the other hand,
could maintain that blocking the proposed transaction is simply
a legitimate exercise of voting power.9 As this example demon-
strates, the mere avoidance of either a 50-50 division in the stock
ownership or an even-numbered board of directors will not neces-
sarily prevent a deadlock from arising.10
The application of 'any of the four remedial procedures must
be triggered by the occurrence of some event defined in the gov-
erning by-laws or shareholders' agreement. 1 If the existence of
a "deadlock" is the triggering event, for example, the governing
document should contain both a listing or other delineation of
the types of issues sufficiently important to be included within
the definition of a "deadlock" and a specification of the voting
division among directors and shareholders which would con-
stitute a "deadlock." To the extent the parties desire that dis-
sension be included in or excluded from the triggering defini-
tion of "deadlock," they may use a definition which comprises
more or fewer types of issues and a broader or narrower range
of voting divisions.
II. REMEDIES
A. THE BuY-OUT
The purpose of the buy-out is to provide a market for the
otherwise generally unmarketable stock 12 of a dissatisfied share-
holder in a close corporation. Several different types of buy-
out provisions may be used for this purpose.
of deadlock in connection with the courts' statutory and equitable pow-
ers of dissolution see Annot., 13 A.L.R.2d 1260, 1262 & n.4 (1950). Pre-
sumably, by defining deadlock in the by-laws or shareholders' agree-
ment for purposes of triggering a remedial arrangement, the sharehold-
ers can obviate such statutory definition and judicial construction. See
note 22 infra and accompanying text.
9. Cf. Aiple v. Twin City Barge & Towing Co., 274 Minn. 38, 143
N.W.2d 374 (1966).
10. Indeed, MINN. STAT. § 301.49(4) (1971) specifically refers to
a deadlock of "two or more factions" as a ground for involuntary disso-
lution, thus apparently contemplating a situation more complex than
that in In re Involuntary Dissolution of Hedberg-Freidheim & Co., 233
Minn. 534, 47 N.W.2d 424 (1951), discussed in note 7 supra. See MODEL
ACT § 97 (a); Israels, supra note 5, at 786-87.
11. See generally Israels, supra note 5, at 791-92.
12. See note 5 supra and accompanying text.
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1. Equal Division of Stock-Two Shareholders
Where the stock of a close corporation is equally divided be-
tween two shareholders, the governing corporate documents
could provide that, upon the occurrence of a deadlock as de-
fined, either party has the right to name a purchase price and
to require the other party to elect to buy or to sell at that
price.13 In the limited category of cases which it fits, this ar-
rangement provides an excellent method for separating the hos-
tile parties, while at the same time preserving the corporation
as an ongoing business. However, three conditions are essen-
tial before the arrangement is appropriate. First, each party
must have sufficient assets, including funds obtainable by the
corporation, to be able to buy out or retire the shares of the
other.14 Second, each party must be able to run the business
without the help of the other. Third, unless the business is much
more valuable than the jobs of the two shareholders with
their close corporation, neither party can be dependent upon his
job. Absent one or more of these conditions, the power in either
party to require the other to choose between a purchase and a
sale could become the power to oppress.1
This first type of buy-out arrangement is particularly at-
tractive in the case of an incorporated joint venture between
two viable independent businesses, each with its own manage-
ment team and its own resources. Although an incorporated
joint venture between such parties would take the form of a
close corporation, the financial strength and independence of the
joint venturers would typically be much greater than in a close
corporation with individual shareholders.
An arbitration clause may be a useful adjunct to a buy-out
provision. For example, under the buy-out arrangement just de-
scribed, the shareholders might disagree as to whether a "dead-
lock" exists within the meaning of a particular definition of the
circumstance that gives a shareholder the right to name a -price
13. The governing documents should provide, of course, that after
one party names a price the other may no longer do so, but must choose
between a purchase or a sale at the price named.
14. For some of the salient features of a redemption as opposed
to a buy-out by a party see notes 19-20 infra and accompanying text.
15. Absent the first condition, for example, party A (sufficient as-
sets) could compel the election by party B (insufficient assets), whose
only choice would be to sell out. Absent the second condition, party
A (independent) could compel the election by party B (dependent),
whose only choice would be to sell out rather than to buy a business
which (s)he could not manage. Thus the absence of any of the three
conditions predetermines the choice made by the electing shareholder.
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and require the other shareholder to choose between a purchase
and a sale. If the definition of deadlock is cast in terms of vari-
ous types of disputes and lists a dispute over a proposed "major"
change in the corporate business, the shareholders might disagree
not only as to the wisdom of the proposed change but also as
to whether the proposed change is "major." To cope with such
definitional disagreements, the document containing the defini-
tion of a deadlock could provide that any controversy over the
existence of a deadlock is subject to arbitration.1"
2. Unequal Division of Stock-More Than Two Shareholders
A buy-out provision is also useful for resolving dissension
and deadlock where the corporate stock is not equally divided
between shareholders, or where there are more than two share-
holders. In these situations the minority interest is ordinarily
the one which would be subject to the buy-out.17 As "dead-
lock" is hard to define in multiple shareholder and uneven
stock split cases,18 the parties might agree to trigger the buy-out
with a different event. For example, the buy-out could be
triggered at the demand of the minority, at the demand of the
majority or at the demand of either, as determined at the time
the close corporation is organized or a new shareholder enters.
There are dangers, however, in such a readily available buy-out
procedure. If the majority is given the option to bring about
the purchase of a minority interest, the majority may exercise
its option to squeeze out the minority, especially if the job of the
minority shareholder is valuable compared with his stock. On
the other hand, if the minority shareholder has the option, the
minority is free to liquidate its holdings even where there is no
genuine dissension between the parties.
3. Tax Considerations
Except in the case of related shareholders falling within
the attribution rules of the Internal Revenue Code,19 the tax
16. It makes no difference what the triggering event is called-a
"deadlock," a "substantial controversy," etc. Arbitration concerns the
question whether that event, as defined in the governing document, has
occurred.
17. For such a buy-out the purchase price might be set by a form-
ula, such as book value, or some agreed multiple of earnings before
taxes and executive salaries or a combination of the two. Alternatively,
the purchase price might be set at fair market value as determined by
arbitration. See text accompanying note 29 infra.
18. See notes 7-10 supra and accompanying text.
19. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 317(b), defines redemption as a cor-
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treatment of a redemption from corporate funds is ordinarily
preferable to that of a buy-out from the personal funds of the
remaining shareholder or shareholders.2 0  However, the corpor-
ate statutes in many states require that the funds for such a re-
demption be drawn only from a corporate surplus.21 There is a
danger with the buy-out by redemption, therefore, that the corp-
oration will have no surplus or that the surplus will be encum-
bered by preferential dividends accumulated but unpaid. Thus,
shareholders who fail to confront a deadlock until the corporation
is in financial trouble may discover their remedial arrangement
has been statutorily nullified.
B. EASY DIssOLUIoN
Dissolution allows an otherwise locked-in shareholder to
bring about a sale of the corporate business and a liquidating
distribution by the close corporation. The purpose of arranging
in advance for an easy dissolution is to circumvent both the ju-
dicial reluctance to grant an involuntary dissolution " and the
poration's purchase of its stock from a shareholder in exchange for prop-
erty. Under the Code such a transaction may be treated as a "divi-
dend," taxable as ordinary income, rather than a "sale," taxable as a
capital gain or loss. Where the departing shareholder is not related to
another shareholder, the redemption is treated as an "exchange" under
section 302(a), because the shareholder retains no stock in the cor-
poration, IhT. RPv. CODE of 1954, § 302 (b) (3). Where the departing
shareholder is related to another shareholder or continues a nonowner-
ship interest in the corporation, however, the redemption will likely not
be treated as an exchange. By the attribution rules of section 318(a),
the departing shareholder is "considered as owning" the stock of the rela-
tive and thus does not fall within the safe harbor of INT. REV. CODE oF
1954, § 302(b) (3). For a comprehensive discussion of corporate redemp-
tions see B. Brxrz- & J. EusTcE, FEDRAL INcoum TAxATiON OF COR-
PORATIONS AND SHAREHOLDERS ch. 9 (3d ed. 1971).
20. Retained corporate funds have been taxed only to the corpora-
tion, while funds distributed as dividends have been taxed to the indi-
vidual as well
21. E.g., Mnx. STAT. § 301.22(6) (1971), which provides:
A corporation may purchase or redeem shares of its own stock,
whether pursuant to contract previously made or otherwise,
only as follows:
(1) Out of earned surplus;
(2) Out of paid-in surplus; provided, that, if the cor-
poration has outstanding shares entitled to preferential divi-
dends or to a preference upon liquidation, then only such
shares may be purchased or redeemed out of paid-in surplus.
22. Courts have been reluctant to allow involuntary dissolution, es-
pecially where the corporation continues to be profitable despite a dead-
lock. See Kruger v. Gerth, 22 App. Div. 2d 916, 255 N.Y.S.2d 498 (1964);
affd 16 N.Y.2d 802, 210 N.E.2d 355, 263 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1965) ("Dissolution
will not be compelled unless it be found that the dominant stockholders
1974]
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voting requirement for a voluntary dissolution.23  Thus the
governing corporate documents can be framed to allow any
shareholder to demand dissolution either at will or after the oc-
currence of a deadlock as defined. 24 To implement the disso-
lution arrangement, each shareholder could grant to a third
party fiduciary, or perhaps to the other shareholders, an irrevo-
cable proxy to vote all the stock of the corporation in favor of a
voluntary dissolution whenever a shareholder is entitled to de-
mand dissolution.
25
There are several provisions which might accompany an
easy dissolution arrangement. Such an arrangement might call
for a delay of four to six months between the demand for dis-
solution and the implementation of the demand, both for the
purpose of allowing a cooling-off period and for the purpose of
allowing for advance planning. Also appropriate for use with
an easy dissolution provision is a clause granting the corporation
an option to redeem the stock of the party seeking dissolution.2 0
The option would be exercisable by one party following a de-
or directors have been 'looting' the corporation's assets and impairing
the corporation's capital or maintaining the corporation for their own
special benefit, thereby enriching themselves at the expense of the mi-
nority shareholders .... ." 22 App. Div. 2d at 917, 255 N.Y.S.2d at 500);
In re Radom & Neidorff, Inc., 307 N.Y. 1, 119 N.E.2d 563 (1954) ("Even
when majority stockholders file a petition because of internal corporate
conflicts, the order [for involuntary dissolution] is granted only when
the competing interests 'are so discordant as to prevent efficient man-
agement' and the 'object of its corporate existence cannot be attained.'"
Id. at 7, 119 N.E.2d at 565). But see, In re Involuntary Dissolution of
Hedberg-Freidheim & Co., 233 Minn. 534, 538-39, 47 N.W.2d 424, 427
(1951) (involuntary dissolution "not predicated on insolvency"), dis-
cussed in note 7 supra; Israels, supra note 5, at 785-86. Moreover, courts
might now apply partnership principles to allow dissolution. See, e.g.,
In the Matter of Surchin v. Approved Business Co., 55 Misc. 2d 888,
286 N.Y.S.2d 580 (1967). Cf. note 8 supra.
23. E.g., statutes cited in note 4 supra.
24. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 355(a) (Cum. Supp. 1968) provides:
"The certificate of incorporation of any close corporation may include
a provision granting to any stockholder . . . an option to have the cor-
poration dissolved at will or upon the occurrence of any specified event
or contingency." The parties can provide for arbitration in the event
they disagree whether a deadlock has occurred which triggers the right
to demand dissolution.
25. Such proxies might be terminable at will if held not to be
"coupled with an interest" as required by a statute such as MINN. STAT.
§ 301.26(4) (1971). See O'NEAL, supra note 3, at § 5.36. To avoid this
risk a commitment to vote in favor of voluntary dissolution under spec-
ified circumstances could be set forth in a shareholders' agreement.
However, litigation might then be necessary in order to compel a recal-
citrant shareholder to act.
26. But see note 21 supra and accompanying text.
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mand for dissolution by the other. The redemption price would
be a sum equal to the expected share of the proceeds which
would be received by the party demanding dissolution if the
corporation were dissolved. Should the shareholders be un-
able to agree on this figure, the anticipated amount of the liq-
uidating distribution could be determined by arbitration.
As an alternative method of implementation, rather than
providing for dissolution upon demand, the parties could limit
the corporate life specified in the articles of incorporation to a
short term of three to five years.27 An unhappy shareholder
might more readily decline to agree to an extension of the cor-
porate life than take the affirmative step of making a demand
for dissolution. Thus, the use of a sharply curtailed corporate
existence makes dissolution easy to obtain, while simplifying
the drafting requirements at the outset. On the other hand, in
view of the long range relationship ordinarily intended when a
close corporation is formed, the participants might resist a pro-
vision for a very short corporate existence.
Whatever the arrangement to make dissolution easily avail-
able, it is important to confine the device of easy dissolution to
those situations where dissolution is not unduly burdensome or
unfair to any shareholder. Thus, easy dissolution should be
contemplated only where all shareholders have marketable skills
for other jobs and where the tax consequences of dissolution are
not significantly more onerous for one shareholder than for an-
other. Unless these conditions are met, the use of an easy dis-
solution arrangement could permit one shareholder in the close
corporation to use the threat of dissolution to oppress another.
C. ARBrmATION
Since arbitration can play such a major role in the resolu-
tion of shareholder disputes in the close corporation, the arbi-
tration remedy has been widely recommended by commenta-
tors.28 As a result, arbitration clauses have undoubtedly often
27. For a discussion of the analogous partnership principles see Is-
raels, supra note 5, at 789-90. In a few states the expiration of cor-
porate life is a statutory ground for involuntary dissolution. CAL. CoRP.
CODE Ax. § 4651(g) (West 1955); MiuN. STAT. § 301.49(5) (1971);
Onto Rsv. CODE ANN. § 1701.91 (A) (Page 1964). But cf. MODEL ACT § 97.
In two states the extension of corporate life gives rise to the appraisal
rights of dissenting shareholders. IDAHO CODE ANN. § 30-150 (1967);
MRNN. STAT. § 301.40 (1971). But cf. MODEL AcT § 80.
28. E.g., O'NEAL, supra note 3, at § 9.08 et seq.; Note, Mandatory
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been used in the hope of providing a quick, private, inexpen-
sive and amicable means for resolving disputes between share-
holders. Arbitration, however, is not as simple as it initially
appears, and arbitration clauses can hardly be treated merely as
part of the boilerplate. If an arbitration clause is used, the ex-
tensive, expanding and rather technical body of law on arbi-
tration and award becomes applicable. Accordingly, arbitration
is the most complex of the remedies under discussion.
Arbitration can be used as an independent remedial ar-
rangement to resolve an issue upon which the shareholders are
in disagreement. As already noted, arbitration can also be used
incident to another remedial arrangement, such as a buy-out or
easy dissolution, to resolve questions which may arise with re-
gard to the existence of a deadlock or the fair value of the stock
being purchased or redeemed. When used for the first purpose,
arbitration will not often be a remedy for dissension, since the
shareholder who loses may be unhappy with the award. Thus,
arbitration as an independent remedy is essentially a device for
deciding an issue which the shareholders and directors cannot
decide. On the other hand, arbitration incident to a buy-out
or easy dissolution arrangement provides relief both from a par-
alyzing deadlock and, to the extent desired, from mere dissension.
1. The Arbitration Remedy
Arbitration in the close corporate context actually embraces
three distinct concepts. First, arbitration may be used as a litiga-
tion substitute to resolve a justiciable controversy. For example,
an arbitrator might be asked to determine whether there is good
cause for the discharge of a shareholder employee or whether a
shareholder has diverted a corporate opportunity. In any dis-
pute of this sort, the courts would be available to resolve the is-
sue were there no arbitration clause. Second, arbitration may
be employed as an appraisal procedure to determine the fair
value of close corporate stock for purposes of a buy-out provision.
Such an appraisal procedure, conducted by one or more arbitra-
tors, must be distinguished from the use of an accountant to de-
termine book value or earnings for purposes of a buy-out for-
mula.29 In Minnesota, for example, an appraisal by arbitration
falls within the Uniform Arbitration Act, which provides for a
Arbitration as a Remedy for Intra-Close Corporate Disputes, 56 VA. L.
REv. 271, 279 (1970).
29. See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 58:985
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hearing,30 the right to counsel,$' the right to cross-examination, -3 2
and other procedural safeguards.33 On the other hand, the desig-
nation of an accountant to examine the books and apply a buy-
out formula is binding at common law, but affords none of the
procedural safeguards of the Uniform Arbitration Act.34 Third,
arbitration may be used as a means to resolve an argument over
management policy. For example, the shareholders of the close
corporation may disagree as to whether it should borrow money
and expand, whether it should change to a new advertising
agency, or whether the company should prefer manufacturer's
representatives to employed salesmen. Such management policy
questions are clearly not of the type a court would resolve.
2. The Enforceabilty of Arbitration Agreements
The enforceability of the three types of arbitration agree-
ments just described depends initially on the state law governing
arbitration clauses generally. At common law the courts en-
forced only agreements to arbitrate existing disputes, adhering
to the theory that agreements to arbitrate future disputes de-
prived them of their jurisdiction. 35  In order to overturn this
common law rule, many states adopted statutes declaring that
agreements to arbitrate future disputes were enforceable. Some
of these arbitration statutes are unclear, however, regarding the
extent to which an enforceable arbitration agreement may cover
disputes other than those cognizable in court.30 As a result, there
remains in many states a judicial reluctance to enforce agree-
ments for the arbitration of non-justiciable controversies, espe-
cially when they touch upon questions of management policy.31
a. Arbitration of a Justiciable Controversy
Although valid as a matter of state arbitration law, an arbi-
tration clause directed at a justiciable controversy may be ren-
30. MnTq. STT. § 572.12 (1971).
31. Id. § 572.13.
32. Id. § 572.12(b).
33. These safeguards include the right to compel attendance of wit-
nesses and the production of records, the use of depositions, and a provi-
sion for sworn testimony. Id. § 572.14.
34. See Sanitary Farm Dairies, Inc. v. Gammel, 195 F.2d 106 (8th
Cir. 1952); Ganmel v. Ernst & Ernst, 245 Minn. 249, 72 N.W.2d 364
(1955).
35. O'NEAL, supra note 3, at § 9.14.
36. Id.; see note 46 infrta.
37. O'NEAL, supra note 3, at § 9.15.
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dered unenforceable by an overriding public policy. In Wilko v.
Swan,38 for example, the United States Supreme Court held that
the right to a judicial forum conferred upon a plaintiff by the
Securities Act of 193339 could not be waived in advance by the
execution of an arbitration agreement. Similarly, other federal
courts have held that disputes arising under the antitrust laws
are not governed by arbitration clauses. 40 Thus, if a shareholder
in a close corporation asserts a claim under the federal securities
laws 41 or antitrust laws, an arbitration clause intended for use
in resolving shareholder disputes might be unenforceable. In-
deed, some New York decisions suggest that the same result
might follow where the shareholder frames the claim as a deriva-
tive suit.42 In the area of justiciable controversies, therefore, the
major stumbling block to arbitration is the risk that public policy
may render the arbitration agreement unenforceable.
b. Arbitration as an Appraisal Procedure
Where arbitration is agreed upon as an appraisal procedure
in conjunction with the buy-out remedial arrangement, it is un-
likely that any overriding public policy would apply to render
the arbitration clause unenforceable. On the other hand, since
38. 346 U.S. 427 (1953).
39. The Securities Act of 1933 § 12, 15 U.S.C. § 771 (1970), provides
that the purchaser of a misrepresented security "may sue either at law
or in equity in any court of competent jurisdiction. . . ." The non-
waiver provision appears in § 14 of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 77n (1970):
"Any condition, stipulation, or provision binding any person acquiring
any security to waive compliance with any provision of this subchapter
or of the rules and regulations of the [Securities and Exchange] Com-
mission shall be void."
40. American Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d
821 (2d Cir. 1968); cf. A & E Plastik Pak Co. v. Monsanto Co., 396 F.2d
710 (9th Cir. 1968).
41. It should be noted that Wilko has been gradually eroded by
subsequent decisions. Cases under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934,
for example, have distinguished Wilko and recognized the enforceability
of arbitration agreements. The reasons are two: first, section 28(b)
of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(b) (1970), creates exceptions to 15
U.S.C. § 78cc(a) (1970), the 1934 Act's nonwaiver provision; second, the
1934 Act cases have not involved the helpless individual investor pro-
tected by the strong policies of the 1933 Act. E.g., Coenen v. R.W.
Pressprich & Co., 453 F.2d 1209 (2d Cir. 1972); Axelrod & Co. v. Kor-
dich, Victor & Neufeld, 451 F.2d 838 (2d Cir. 1971); Brown v. Gilligan,
Will & Co., 287 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). For an excellent discus-
sion of the demise of Wilko see 3 L. Loss, SECURIrIEs REGULATION 1811-
17 (2d ed. 1961), as supplemented by 4 L. Loss, SEcuRiTIEs REGULATION
3932-34 (Supp. 1969).
42. O'NEAL, supra note 3, at § 9.19.
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a dispute about stock valuation is unlikely to be regarded as a
justiciable controversy, the enforceability of an appraisal provi-
sion depends upon the provisions of state arbitration law. In
Minnesota and New York, for example, the applicable arbitration
statutes are not limited to justiciable controversies,43 and the
Minnesota Supreme Court has said:
In contracts providing for arbitration of future controversies, the
parties may narrowly limit arbitrability or they may compre-
hensively provide that all disputes, whether arising under the
terms of the contract or growing out of their relationship-
even though- not cognizable in a court of law or equity-may
be referable to arbitration.44
A dispute about the value of corporate stock for the purpose of a
buy-out provision would appear to be the type of dispute "aris-
ing under the terms of the contract or growing out of [the par-
ties'] relationship" which the parties may agree to refer to ar-
bitration.4 5
c. Arbitration of Management Policy Disputes
It is in a provision for resolving management policy disputes
that the arbitration clause encounters the most substantial ques-
tion of validity. In the first place, it is less likely that a state's
arbitration statutes will contemplate the resolution of such a
dispute than, for example, a dispute over the value of stock.40
43. See note 46 infra. For a discussion of other statutory provi-
sions see Q'NEAL, supra note 3, at §§ 9.14, .16.
44. Layne-Minnesota Co. v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn., 266
Minn. 284, 288-89, 123 N.W.2d 371, 375 (1963) (emphasis added).45. Support for this position is found in the analogy to the statu-
tory appraisal procedure for the benefit of a dissenting shareholder un-
der MiNx. STAT. § 301.40 (1971) (change of corporate purpose or exten-
sion of corporate life) and MNw. STAT. § 301.44 (1971) (merger). In-
deed, subdivision 3 of section 301.40 specifically refers to the statutory
appraisal procedure as an "arbitration."
46. E.g., MnmN. STAT. § 572.08 (1971) provides:
A written agreement to submit any existing controversy to
arbitration or a provision in a written contract to submit to
arbitration any controversy thereafter arising between the
parties is valid, enforceable, and irrevocable, save upon such
grounds as exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any
contract (emphasis added)
In New York non-justiciable controversises were formerly held not to
be arbitrable. Application of Burkin, 1 N.Y.2d 570, 136 N.E.2d 862, 154
N.Y.S.2d 898 (1956). The arbitration statute was then amended to make
arbitration agreements "enforceable without regard to the justiciable
character of the controversy." N.Y. Civ. PRAc. lAw Aim RuLEs § 7501
(1963). Decided after this amendment, Vogel v. Lewis, 19 N.Y.2d 589, 224
N.E.2d 738, 278 N.Y.S.2d 236 (1967), aff'g 25 App. Div. 2d 212, 268 N.Y.S.
2d 237 (1966), arguably supports the proposition that management policy
disputes are now arbitrable in New York. The decision can be read nar-
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With lingering notions of the justiciability requirement, more-
over, a court may be reluctant to extend to an arbitrator the
power to make a determination which the court would not under-
take itself.47 At the very least, therefore, one might expect that
specific language including management policy disputes would be
required by the court if the arbitration clause were to be broadly
construed and enforced.
Even where state arbitration law permits the arbitration of
non-justiciable controversies, state corporate law may prevent
arbitration of management policy disputes. Corporate statutes
generally entrust the management to the board of directors,48
and such an arbitration provision might 'be held to be an in-
vasion of the statutory powers of the directors.4  Although some
courts have been unwilling to enforce the delegation of manage-
ment powers to an arbitrator, there have been indications in the
more recent cases that this judicial attitude is changing.5 0
Yet a third hurdle to the enforcement of an arbitration
clause in the context of a management policy dispute is the
problem of implementing the arbitrator's decision. The share-
holders might grant to each other or to some third party the
proxies to vote for the implementation of the decision of the
arbitrator. However, the shareholder whose views lost out in
the arbitration proceeding could well be the key employee
responsible for implementing the decision. Foreseeing an end-
less judicial supervision of the day-to-day conduct of the busi-
ness in such a case, a court may be especially reluctant to find
rowly, however, as limiting arbitration to questions involving the very
continued existence of the corporation as opposed to questions involving
the mere day-to-day management of the corporation. O'NEAL, supra note
3, at § 9.16. The Minnesota provision quoted above is neither as narrow
as the old New York law nor as broad as the law in its amended form.
Cf. notes 44-45 supra and accompanying text.
47. See notes 35-37 supra and accompanying text.
48. E.g., MODEL ACT § 35; MINN. STAT. § 301.28 (1971) provides that
"the business of a corporation shall be managed by a board of directors
49. In Minnesota, a partial answer to this problem is found in the
case of Hart v. Bell, 222 Minn. 69, 23 N.W.2d 375 (1946), where the court
sustained a shareholders' voting agreement .as to management policy.
Arguably, the Bell holding could be extended to management policy ar-
bitration pursuant to the provisions of a shareholders' agreement. Ac-
cord, Galler v. Galler, 32 Ill. 2d 16, 203 N.E.2d 577 (1964), wherein the
Illinois court sustained a shareholders' agreement which arrogated direc-
torial powers over dividends and the selection of corporate officers. See
also DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 350 (Cum. Supp. 1968).
50. See O'NEAL, supra note 3, at §§ 9.15-.16.
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an arbitration clause enforceable for the purpose of resolving a
matter of management policy.51
3. The Arbitrator's Qualifications
-The above three types of arbitration provisions differ not
only in their enforceability but also in the qualifications they de-
mand of the arbitrator. If justiciable controversies are to be re-
solved by arbitration, the shareholders will ordinarily prefer an
arbitrator who is experienced and qualified in the art of judicial
decision-making. For this purpose the parties might look to an
experienced arbitrator or to a retired or former judge.52
Where the question referred to an arbitrator is the valuation
of stock in a closely held corporation, there is little point in choos-
ing an arbitrator whose primary experience has been in the field
of judicial decision-making. Instead, the parties would ordinarily
prefer one or more arbitrators who are experts in appraising the
value of businesses of the type involved. Investment bankers,
business brokers and acquisition executives may qualify as such
experts. For the purpose of management policy dispute arbitra-
tion, the choice of an arbitrator presents an array of difficulties.
The arbitrator must be at once someone capable of mediating be-
tween warring factions and someone who knows the industry
well enough to make a sound management policy decision. The
arbitrator cannot, however, be a competitor. In most cases,
therefore, the only appropriate arbitrator would be a retired ex-
51. A good example of the problem of enforceability is found in
Ringling v. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Comb. Shows, Inc., 29 Del.
Ch. 318, 49 A.2d'603 (1946), where the Chancellor held that a share-
holders' agreement was not contrary to public policy in providing that
the parties were bound by the instructions of an arbitrator as to how
they must vote in the event of disagreement on matters of management
policy. The arbitrator's decision was held enforceable upon the theory
that the agreement "constitute[d] the willing party to the Agreement
an implied agent possessing the irrevocable proxy of the recalcitrant
party for the purpose of casting the particular vote." Id. at 335,
49 A.2d at 611. On appeal, however, the Supreme Court of Delaware
rejected the irrevocable proxy rationale and held that the arbitrator's
decision was unenforceable without the vote of the recalcitrant party.
The court stated that the parties' agreement that the arbitrator's decision
would be binding meant only "that each party promised the other to
exercise her own voting rights in accordance with the arbitrator's deci-
sion. The agreement is silent about any exercise of the voting rights
of one party by the other." 29 Del Ch. 610, 619, 53 A.2d 441, 446 (1947).
52. Incumbent judges may be the best qualified to serve as arbi-
trators of justiciable controversies, but would be barred from serving
in this capacity by Canon 5 (E) of the ABA CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCr
(adopted in 1972).
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ecutive with a suitable background in the industry and without
any current ties to a competitor. There can be little assurance
in advance that such an individual will either be available or be
willing and able to serve.
From the foregoing review of the enforceability of arbitra-
tion agreements and the considerations involved in choosing an
appropriate arbitrator, only justiciable controversies and ap-
praisals of stock value emerge as areas where arbitration is
feasible. In view of the questions of enforceability and the dif-
ficulty of finding an arbitrator, it appears that arbitration is of
doubtful practical value in the context of management policy
disputes. If a policy dispute is so serious that the shareholders
in a close corporation cannot reach agreement, the corporation
is probably headed for either dissolution or a buy-out of one of
the contending factions.
4. Arbitration Agreement Drafting Considerations
One of the benefits of an arbitration clause is that it puts
pressure on the contending shareholders to settle their differ-
ences rather than run the risk of a potentially unwelcome
award by an outsider. This salutary effect has undoubtedly
served to resolve justiciable controversies, stock valuation ques-
tions and, perhaps, even management policy issues. But some
disputes are not settled. If an arbitration must actually be con-
ducted, the precise language of the arbitration clause becomes
important. When the arbitration clause is drafted, therefore,
a number of somewhat technical points should be considered if
arbitration is to achieve a just result in a contested case in-
volving a close corporation.53
The draftsman of an arbitration agreement must examine
both the corporate and arbitration law of the jurisdiction to de-
termine whether the by-laws or the shareholders' agreement
should contain the arbitration provisions. In Minnesota, for
example, the Business Corporation Act does not explicitly au-
thorize a by-law provision which requires arbitration.54 More-
53. The ensuing list illustrates drafting considerations which arise
under Minnesota law.
54. MimN. STAT. § 301.24 (1971) provides: "The shareholders may
make and alter bylaws . . . for the government of the corporation, the
conduct of its affairs, the management of its property and business, and
the transfer of its shares." While a court might decide that this lan-
guage embraces a noncontractual by-law provision calling for the arbi-
tration of some types of issues, the Uniform Arbitration Act presents
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over, the Uniform Arbitration Act validates an arbitration clause
only if it appears "in a written contract."55 Hence, it is essential
that the arbitration clause be contained in the shareholders'
agreement rather than the corporate by-laws."6 This require-
ment likely pertains in other jurisdictions unless the by-laws
themselves are considered a "written contract" between the par-
ties. 57 To perpetuate the enforceability of the agreement, the
corporation's stock certificates should be stamped with the leg-
end that they are transferable only to persons who consent to
be bound by the agreement.58
Assuming the agreement is thus an enforceable contract, it
should contain a provision enabling a court to enter judgment
on the award of the arbitrator.59 The American Arbitration
Association recommends the provision in the Standard Arbitra-
tion Clause that "judgment upon the award rendered by the
Arbitrator(s) may be entered in any Court having jurisdiction
thereof. °6 0 This language, in conjunction with a requirement
in the arbitration agreement that the arbitration be conducted
a more dependable statutory basis for an arbitration clause. See note
55 infra and accompanying text.
55. M .STAT. § 572.08 (1971).
56. The arbitration clause should bind the corporation as well as
the shareholders, since the arbitrable dispute may arise between a
shareholder and the corporation rather than between two shareholders.
57. In an -action brought by a member of defendant corporation
to establish his membership rights, the Minnesota court has declared
that a "by-law, though not expressly authorized [by statute], may oper-
ate as a contract between the corporation on one side and its members
on the other so as to be binding on both ... ." Strong v. Minneapolis
Auto. Trade Ass'n, 151 Minn. 406, 409, 186 N.W. 800, 801 (1922). The
court thus treated the by-laws as a contract between a corporate organi-
zation and its members for the purpose of establishing the members'
interest in the corporation. Accord, Pierce v. Grand Army of the Re-
public, 224 Minn. 248, 28 N.W.2d 637 (1947).
The Nebraska court has treated the contents of a corporation's by-
laws as an agreement between the parties organizing the corporation.
Baum v. Baum Holding Co., 158 Neb. 197, 62 N.W.2d 864 (1954). And
a Wisconsin decision applied contractual rules of construction for pur-
poses of interpreting corporate by-laws. State ex Tel. Siciliano v. John-
son, 21 Wis. 2d 482, 124 N.W.2d 624 (1963).
58. Such a legend would reflect the provision in the agreement to
the same effect. It should be noted that while such restrictions were
once considered an unlawful restraint on alienation, they are now gen-
erally accepted. See, e.g., DEL. CODE AxN. tit. 8, §§ 202, 342, 347, 349
(Cum. Supp. 1968).
59. For a discussion of the scope of that award see note 69 infra
and accompanying text.
60. This language also prevents any offset of other claims against
the arbitration award. Grudem Bros. Co. v. Great Western Piping
Corp., 213 N.W.2d 920 (Minn. 1973).
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in a particular state, insures that the courts of the state will have
jurisdiction to enter a judgment on the award."'
In Minnesota the venue for any court proceeding pertaining
to an arbitration can be lodged in the county where the agree-
ment dictates the arbitration hearing be held.0 2 In view of the
statutory provisions on jurisdiction and venue, the arbitration
clause might appropriately call for arbitration in the county of
the corporation's principal place of business.
To minimize the risk that a party may attempt to evade the
arbitration procedure by initiating a lawsuit, the parties should
curtail their right to invoke the jurisdiction of the courts. To
this end the arbitration clause can provide that the completion
of the arbitration proceeding is a condition precedent to any
litigation involving arbitrable subject matter.0 3  The parties
could also expressly waive any right which might otherwise
exist to disregard the arbitration clause and bring a derivative
suit or an involuntary dissolution proceeding because of dead-
61. For example, MINN. STAT. § 572.24 (1971) provides: "The
making of an agreement. . . providing for arbitration in this state con-
fers jurisdiction on the court [defined as any Minnesota court of compe-
tent jurisdiction] to enforce the agreement . . . and to enter judgment
on an award thereunder." (emphasis added) The recommended lan-
guage conforms even more closely to the jurisdiction provision in the
United States Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. § 9 (1970). See Varley v. Tarry-
town Associates, Inc., 477 F.2d 208 (2d Cir. 1973).
In Minnesota, the requirement that the arbitration be conducted
within the state should not be necessary in the agreement, as dis-
trict courts have a broad grant of general jurisdiction. MrNN. CONST.
art. 6, § 5 provides that "[t]he district court shall have original jurisdic-
tion in all civil and criminal cases," and MINN. STAT. § 484.01 (1971)
provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction in all civil
actions within their respective districts . . . in all special pro-
ceedings not exclusively cognizable by some other court or
tribunal, and in all other cases wherein such jurisdiction is
especially conferred upon them by law.
62. MINN. STAT. § 572.25 (1971). As MNN. STAT. § 572.12(a)
(1971) authorizes the arbitrator to designate the precise locus of the
hearing, the agreement need not specify a particular address within the
county.
63. The arbitration clause sustained in Layne-Minnesota Co. v. Re-
gents of the Univ. of Minn., 266 Minn. 284, 287, 123 N.W.2d 371, 374
(1963), contained the following provision: "It is mutually agreed that
the decision of the arbitrators shall be a condition precedent to any
right of legal action that either party may have against the other." In
some states, the statute of limitations does not apply to arbitration pro-
ceedings, and does not begin to run for purposes of a proceeding to com-
pel arbitration until there has been both a demand and a refusal to arbi-
trate. Har-Mar, Inc. v. Thorsen & Thorshov, Inc., 218 N.W.2d 751 (Minn.
1974). To avoid the risk of stale claims, the arbitration clause should
specifically limit the time within which a demand for arbitration may be
made.
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lock. Even with such a waiver, however, a court might hold
that the public policy behind the derivative suit or dissolution
proceeding is so strong that the parties cannot contract in ad-
vance for a different remedy. 64
If the parties require particular qualifications of the arbi-
trator, such as experience in the valuation of businesses or ex-
perience in a particular industry, these qualifications should be
specified in the arbitration clause.0 5
Generally, unless an issue is clearly beyond the scope of an
arbitration clause, the initial determination of arbitrability is
made by the arbitrator, subject to later review by the courts. 6"
Thus, if the arbitration clause merely uses broad language such
as "any controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this
contract," 67 the hoped-for speed, privacy and economy of an ar-
bitration proceeding could be lost in court proceedings to deter-
mine whether such language extends to a plainly non-justiciable
controversy, such as a management policy dispute. Hence, the
arbitration clause should clearly delineate the types of justiciable
controversies, valuation questions, and management policy issues
which are intended to be arbitrable.0 8
Under the Uniform Arbitration Act, an arbitrator is often
granted the power to award relief which "could not or would not
64. See O'NEAL, supra note 3, at § 9.19. For a discussion of other
such overriding public policies see notes 38-42 supra and accompanying
texL
65. MN. STAT. § 572.10 (1971). See note 52 supra and accom-
panying text. Upon the subject of possible bias, lmnN. STAT. §§ 572.12
(C), .19 (1) (2) (1971) refer to "neutral" arbitrators in such a way as to
imply that some arbitrators need not be "neutral" In contrast, MnN.
STAT. § 301.40(2) (1971), pertaining to the appraisal of dissenting shares
in certain situations, requires valuation by "three disinterested apprais-
ers, one of whom shall be named by the shareholders, another by the
corporation, and the third by the two thus chosen." (emphasis added)
Although arbitration agreements often call for two party-appointed ar-
bitrators, together with a "neutral" arbitrator appointed by the party-
appointed arbitrators, the objective judgment of all three arbitrators
might better be assured by having all three either mutually agreed
upon, court appointed, or appointed by the American Arbitration Asso-
ciation.
66. See, e.g., Layne-Minnesota Co. v. Regents of the Univ. of Minn.,
266 Minn. 284, 291, 123 N.W.2d 371, 376-77 (1963).
67. This language is part of the Standard Arbitration Clause of the
American Arbitration Association.
68. Inasmuch as fraud in the inducement of an agreement is justi-
ciable, but is arbitrable only if specifically included in the arbitration
clause, it would be a mistaken assumption that broad language would
encompass all justiciable controversies. See Atcas v. Credit Clearing
Corp. of America, 292 Mlnn. 334, 197 N.W.2d 448 (1972).
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be granted by a court of law or equity."69 As a result, the parties
to a close corporation shareholders' agreement might include
some limitation upon the types of relief which the arbitrator can
grant. To the extent the arbitration clause defines the issues
subject to arbitration (for example, whether good cause exists
for the discharge of a shareholder employee), such a limitation
can be achieved by restricting the arbitrator to answering the
question presented.
Although comprehensive pre-trial discovery may well be
indispensable in preparing for a complex trial, unnecessary dis-
covery could make a simple arbitration proceeding unduly slow
and expensive. Perhaps as a result, the only discovery contem-
plated by the Uniform Arbitration Act is 'a procedure for taking
depositions of witnesses who either cannot be subpoenaed or can-
not attend the hearing.70 To accommodate the interests of speed
and adequate preparation the parties could, therefore, provide in
the arbitration agreement that the arbitrator have discretion to
authorize pre-arbitration discovery in accordance with either
state or federal discovery rules.
The concept of burden of proof customarily plays no role in
an arbitration proceeding. The Uniform Arbitration Act is
silent on the subject, as are the Commercial Arbitration Rules
of the American Arbitration Association. In the close corpora-
tion context, however, the relationship of the parties may be
such that one or the other should bear the burden of proof. In
that event the arbitration agreement should provide a burden of
proof requirement with respect to some or all issues which may
arise.
Where arbitration is used to resolve a justiciable contro-
versy, a requirement in the agreement that the arbitrator issue
formal findings and conclusions would seem to be a prudent
safeguard. On the other hand, where the arbitration is con-
ducted for appraisal pursuant to a buy-out provision, such a re-
quirement would seem unnecessary. In the latter situation,
the arbitrators essentially perform a jury function and should
be required only to determine an appropriate dollar valuation,
not to articulate a supporting rationale.
69. UNIFoRM ARBITRATiON ACT § 12; see also MINN. STAT. § 572.19
(1971).
70. UNIFORM ARBITRATION ACT § 7(b); see also MiNN. STAT. § 572.14
(b) (1971). Cf. Bigge Crane & Rigging Co. v. Docutel Corp., 371 F.
Supp. 240 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), where the court stayed pending litigation, but
ordered discovery in aid of arbitration.
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Under the Uniform Arbitration Act, the arbitrator is denied
the power to award counsel fees in the absence of a provision
to the contrary in the arbitration agreement. 71 Such a provision
granting the arbitrator discretion over the award of counsel fees
might help to discourage frivolous arbitration demands.
D. THE PROviSIONAL DmECTOR
The final remedial arrangement to be treated in this Article
is the provisional director. The purpose of providing for the
appointment of such a director is to resolve close corporate vot-
ing deadlocks by adding to the board of directors a mediator
who can cast a deciding vote. Such an arrangement seems best
suited to resolve a deadlock in connection with management
policy disputes. Since the provisional director could serve in
an ongoing capacity, he would be in a better position than an
arbitrator to see that his decisions are implemented. Further-
more, the provisional director might, on rare occasions, succeed
in keeping the disputing parties together.72  More likely, how-
ever, a dispute that is serious enough to necessitate the appoint-
ment of such a director will soon result in a buy-out or dissolu-
tion.
In the few states which have tailored special laws for the
close corporation, the procedure for the judicial appointment of
a -provisional director is statutory. 73 Although there is no such
express statutory provision in Minnesota, an equivalent arrange-
ment is at least arguably permissible. The Business Corporation
Act provides that where shares are held in a representative or
fiduciary capacity and where the representatives or fiduciaries
are equally divided, the court may "appoint an additional person
to act with them in determining the manner in which such
71. UanFomVu ARBraATION ACT § 10; see also MAnu. STAT. § 572.17
(1971).
72. Sometimes an attorney who enjoys the confidence of the parties
can reconcile their differences simply by acting as an informal advisor.
73. For example, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 353 (a) (Cum. Supp.
1968) provides:
[T]he Court of Chancery may appoint a provisional director for
a close corporation if the directors are so divided respecting the
management of the corporation's business and affairs that the
votes required for action by the board of directors cannot be
obtained with the consequence that the business and affairs of
the corporation can no longer be conducted to the advantage of
the stockholders generally.
See also id. § 352 (b) ; O'NAL, supra note 3, at § 9.30.
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shares shall be voted upon the particular questions as to which
they are divided. ' 74 The Act has a like provision which per-
tains to stock held in a voting trust.75 The court appointment
of an additional person to act with equally divided representa-
tives, fiduciaries or voting trustees would amount to the ap-
pointment of a provisional shareholder.
In order to use such a provisional shareholder to perform the
functions of a statutory provisional director, the shareholders, as-
suming a 50-50 division of their stock and corresponding repre-
sentation on the board of directors, could put their shares in a
voting trust having the two shareholders as trustees. The by-
laws could then provide that any questions on which the direc-
tors are deadlocked must be submitted to the shareholders for
decision. If the voting trustees then could not agree, relief
could be sought through the court appointment of a provisional
shareholder.76
Alternatively, the parties could find a neutral third person
to hold a separate class of stock with only a nominal equity inter-
est in the corporation, but with the power to elect a provisional
director in the event that the two director-shareholders were
equally divided. 7 Since the Business Corporation Act requires
that directors be elected by shareholders, 7 the use of a separate
class of stock for the election of the provisional director is prefer-
able to a provision purporting to give the appointment power to
a non-shareholder.
Neither of the schemes just outlined, however, provides
any convincing assurance of validity. If the shareholders were
seriously divided, there would likely be a court test of the
scheme, resulting in delay and expense even were the court ulti-
mately to sustain the arrangement for the provisional share-
holder or director. Moreover, even with a strong indemnifica-
tion clause protecting the provisional shareholder or director,
the difficulties of finding someone both able and willing to
assume the responsibility might preclude the use of the arrange-
ment.
74. Mnmr. STAT. § 301.26(6) (1971).
75. Id. § 301.27(3).
76. Rather than seek court appointment of the tie-breaking trustee,
the parties could provide in the trust indenture agreement some other
mechanism for selecting the trustee.
77. See Recent Cases, 85 HARv. L. REv. 1676 (1972).
78. MVN. STAT. § 301.28 (2) (1971),
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III. CONCLUSION
As the remedies for dissension and deadlock in the close
corporation are far from perfect, the principals in the corpora-
tion should take every precaution to prevent conflicts from
arising. If irreconcilable disputes do arise, however, the parties
should have planned ahead for their resolution. Rather than
relying upon statutory remedies, the parties should create their
own remedies by drafting appropriate provisions in the by-laws
or shareholders' agreement either at the time the close corpora-
tion is formed or at the time a new owner joins the enterprise.
The four remedial arrangements discussed in this Article
must be suited not only to a particular close corporate situation
but also to the applicable state law mandates. Absent a legisla-
tive or judicial imprimatur, the arrangements to provide both ar-
bitration and a provisional director are of doubtful validity in
many cases, especially where management policy disputes arise.
In contrast, the arrangements to provide both a buy-out and an
easy dissolution are generally supported by state law.

